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Abstract - This paper uses a VAR approach to investigate the effects of aggregate and disaggregate 
measures of public investment in transportation infrastructures on private investment, employment, and output 
in Portugal. Estimation results suggest that public investment in transportation infrastructures crowds in 
private investment and employment and, therefore, has a strong positive effect on output.  Indeed, we estimate 
that one euro invested in public investment increases output in the long-term by 9.5 euros. This figure suggests 
that public investment pays for itself 3.3 times in the form of tax revenues over the life span of the public 
capital asset.  Furthermore, this figure corresponds to a rate of return of 15.9%, which is clearly higher than 
the rate of return expected on private investment activities. A close look at the effects of different types of 
public investment is very informative, since it shows which types of public investments are the most 
productive. In terms of marginal productivities, the highest effects on private investment come from public 
investment in ports, airports and national roads. In terms of job creation, the highest effects come from public 
investment in ports, municipal roads, and national roads.   Finally, in terms of the effects on output the largest 
effects come from investment in ports followed by national roads, municipal roads, airports, and railroads.  
The results in this paper are very important from a public policy perspective.  This is because they suggest that 
public investment in transportation infrastructures has been a powerful instrument to promote long-term 
growth and that the strategy followed by the Portuguese authorities of investing in public infrastructures is 
justified both from a long-term development perspective as well as from a public budgetary perspective.   
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I.  Introduction 
 
One of the nagging aspects in the Portuguese economic performance is the relative backwardness of 
the Portuguese economy vis-à-vis the European Union partners.  From the 1970s until around the late 1980s 
the Portuguese GDP per capita in purchasing power parity was just approximately around 55% of the EU 
average.  The magnitude and persistence of the relative backwardness of the Portuguese economy has been 
explained by the lack of domestic long-term growth fundamentals.  Historically serious distortions in the 
financial markets lead to lagging private investment while a narrow domestic tax base hindered the 
development of a modern infrastructure.  These difficulties justified the EU structural funds programs after 
1989.  The cornerstone of these structural transfer programs was the development of a modern transportation 
infrastructure network. Therefore, over the last decade, the strategy of development in Portugal has been 
largely based on transportation infrastructure development. 
Interestingly enough, despite the central role of public infrastructure development and the intuitive 
knowledge of the relative scarcity of public infrastructures in Portugal, no information was available on the 
actual impact of this development strategy.  While the impact of infrastructure development on private 
investment, employment and output has been assumed to be positive and important, there has been complete 
ignorance as to what the actual effects might be.  In particular, no estimates exist of the rates of return on 
different types of infrastructure investment.  Therefore no information exists on relationship between the rates 
of return on public investments and the rate of return on private investment projects. This information, 
however, is crucial to determine the appropriateness of the development strategy followed in Portugal. 
The most important reason for the absence of estimates of the rates of return to public infrastructure 
investment in Portugal, as indeed for most other countries of comparable or lower levels of development, has 
been the absence of the most basic data on public investment itself.  This is because of the highly 
decentralized nature of the institutions in charge of the different types of public investment as well as the 
constant shifting in jurisdictions in public investment activities.  In the case of Portugal, however, the problem 
of the absence of a data set has now been solved.  The authors concluded recently the construction of a 
detailed database of public investment in transportation infrastructures, under the auspices of the Portuguese 
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Ministry of Planning [see Pereira and Andraz (2001)]. 
In this paper we estimate empirically the impact of infrastructure investment in the area of 
transportation on aggregate economic performance in Portugal.  We focus on aggregate public investment as 
well as on different types of transportation infrastructure - roads and highways, ports, airports, and railways - 
to evaluate the effects of such public investments on private investment, employment and, ultimately, on 
output.  We seek to estimate the marginal products and the rates of return of public investment in different 
types of transportation infrastructures. 
Although this paper focuses on the Portuguese case and deals with issues that are of great importance 
for policy making in Portugal, its interest is not merely parochial. Indeed, the issue of the effects of public 
investment on private sector performance has been at the center of the policy debate in many countries, in 
many regions of the world.  In particular, in the European Union, the development strategy of the less 
development countries, like Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, has been based largely on public investment 
projects. For these countries, public investment on infrastructures, through EU structural programs, has been 
the instrument of choice to induce real convergence of the domestic economy to the EU standards of living. 
Furthermore, in the near future, the eastward expansion of the EU will bring into the fold countries with 
similar problems.  For these Eastern European countries, economy recovery seems to depend, in large scale, 
on the reconstruction of obsolete infrastructures.  For these countries joining the EU and, thereby, embarking 
in large public infrastructure projects seems to be the expected vehicle for vanquishing their relative 
backwardness. 
The empirical evaluation of the effects of public capital formation on private output was brought to 
the limelight by the work of Aschauer (1989a, 1989b).  Using a single-equation static production function 
approach based on aggregate measures of public capital, Aschauer (1989a, 1989b) suggests that public capital 
has been a powerful engine for growth in the United States.  In fact, his results suggest that public investment 
would pay for itself close to three times in the form of additional tax revenues over the duration of the public 
capital assets [see Reich (1991)].  Subsequent analysis applying the same methodology to regional and sector-
specific data in the United States as well as international data, however, failed to replicate such large effects.  
Indeed, it often even failed to find meaningful positive results [see Gramlich (1994) and Munnell (1992) for 
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detailed surveys of the literature and Hulten and Schwab (1993) for a detailed presentation on the 
infrastructure debate]. 
The work of Aschauer inspired an important body of literature on the impact of infrastructure 
development for other countries.  This includes contributions that are country-specific and others that have a 
multi-country focus.  In the first case one could mention, for example, the work of Otto and Voss (1996) for 
Australia, Seitz (1994) for Germany, Sturm and de Haan (1995) for Holland, Merriman (1990) for Japan, 
Shah (1992) for Mexico, Pereira and Roca (1999) for Spain, Berndt and Hansson (1992) for Sweden, and 
Lynde and Richmond (1993) for the UK.  In the second case one could mention, for example, the work of 
Aschauer (1989c), Evans and Karras (1993), Ford and Poret (1991), and Mittnik and Newman (1998), all 
focusing on developed OECD countries.  The magnitude and significance of the empirical results varies 
greatly among countries.  Furthermore, international comparisons are rendered very difficult by the use in the 
literature of different measures of public capital, different levels of aggregation, and different methodologies. 
  
The approach used in Aschauer (1989a, 1989b) and much of the literature that followed focuses on 
measuring the effects of public investment on private output using a single equation, static production function 
approach. In this approach, private output is regressed on public capital and private inputs – employment and 
capital.  This approach has been criticized on econometric grounds.  It has been observed that the estimation 
of static, univariate production functions in levels (or log-levels) is based on non-stationary variables. 
Therefore, OLS estimates are spurious in the absence of cointegration.  Moreover, OLS estimates suffer from 
simultaneity bias. Even if this bias is corrected, conclusions about causality still cannot be drawn. [See 
Jorgenson (1991) and Munnell (1992) for comprehensive discussion of these econometric problems.] 
In this paper, we follow Pereira (2000) and adopt a vector auto-regressive/error correction 
mechanism approach.  This multivariate time series approach allows us to address the aforementioned 
econometric criticisms in a rigorous and comprehensive manner.  It also brings a more precise conceptual 
focus to the debate about whether or not public capital is productive. In fact, the static single-equation 
framework, so often used in the literature, excludes the presence of feedbacks, in particular dynamic 
feedbacks, among the relevant variables.  This exclusion is of paramount importance for it is likely that 
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feedbacks exist.  If they do, a zero elasticity of private output with respect to public capital, as obtained from a 
single-equation static production function approach, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for public 
investment to be ineffective in influencing output.   
Dynamic feedbacks are essential to a conceptual understanding of the relationship between public 
investment and aggregate economic performance.  Indeed, public investment affects output directly as an 
additional input in the production function.  Moreover, as a positive externality to aggregate production, 
public investment should, ceteris paribus, lead to higher aggregate production. Public investment also affects 
aggregate production indirectly via its effects on the use of private inputs, capital and labor.  It is conceivable 
that a greater availability of public capital could reduce the demand for private inputs (a substitution effect).  
Higher availability of public capital, however, also increases the marginal productivity of private inputs. This 
lowers the marginal costs of production, thereby potentially increasing the level of aggregate production (a 
scale effect).  
In turn, the evolution of private inputs and aggregate output can conceivably affect the evolution of 
public investment.  Indeed, increasing aggregate output provides the government with a growing tax base and 
the potential for greater public investment.  Furthermore, declining employment has often led to short-term 
policy packages that involve increased public investment.  There is, therefore, a real possibility that reverse 
causality exists.  By this we mean that it is possible that the evolution of aggregate output and private inputs 
may be leading the evolution of public investment.  
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the data set used in our analysis.  In 
particular, we present in some detail the new public investment data for Portugal (see also the Appendix).  We 
also report preliminary empirical results including univariate and cointegration analysis and report on the 
specification of the vector auto-regressive/error correction mechanism models.  In Section III, we introduce 
and discuss some methodological issues in the identification and measurement of the effects of innovations in 
public investment. In Section IV, we analyze the effects on economic performance - output, employment, and 
private investment - of aggregate and disaggregate measures of public investment through the use of 
orthogonalized impulse response functions.  Finally, in Section V, we provide a summary and some 
concluding remarks. 
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II.  Data and Preliminary Empirical Results   
 
A. Data: sources and description 
We use annual data for the period 1976 to 1998.  We consider output (gdp), employment (emp), 
private investment (inv), in addition to public investment in transportation infrastructures (pinv).  The data on 
output, employment, and private investment in presented in Table 1.  This data was obtained from the Bank of 
Portugal/Banco de Portugal (1997), Commission of the European Communities (1999), and Ministry of 
Finance/Ministério das Finanças (2000).  Output and private investment are measured in millions of constant 
1995 Portuguese escudos while employment is measured in full-time equivalent employees.   
The data for public investment in transportation infrastructures (pinv) is obtained from Pereira and 
Andraz (2001).  This database is the result of a long and meticulous investigation, sponsored by the 
Portuguese Ministry of Planning. This database includes data on public investment, both at current and 
constant 1995 prices deflated by the GDP as well as the private investment deflators.  It includes public 
investment in national roads, municipal roads, highways, ports, airports, and railways. It covers the period 
from 1974 to 1998, despite some failures of information regarding the two first years, due to lost data at the 
source. Since this database has not been published before and is used in this article for the first time, it is 
provided here in Table 2 and we discuss some of its main features below.  For the same reason we also 
included in an Appendix to this paper the executive summary of Pereira and Andraz (2001). All of the data is 
in 1995 Portuguese escudos deflated using the GDP price deflator.  The use of the private investment deflator 
would lead to only marginal changes in the empirical results in this paper. 
To talk about the main features of the public investment data in Portugal one has immediately to 
recognize the existence in the second half of the sample period of EU sponsored structural transfer programs 
in the form of Community Support Frameworks for Portugal. The first Community Support Framework 
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program covered the period from 1989 to 1993 and the second covered the period from 1994 to 1999. 
Therefore, our sample includes 13 years prior the programs and 10 years of with the programs.   
In what follows we consider an aggregate measure of public investment in transportation 
infrastructures, as well as six disaggregated measures pertaining to public investment on roads, ports, airports 
and railways.  We present the evolution of each type of investment as a percentage of the GDP and as a 
percentage of private investment in Tables 3 and 4, respectfully, and in Figures 1-7.  We present the evolution 
of the composition of public investment in transportation infrastructures in Table 5 and Figure 8.  
The first type of public investment (pinv1) is core infrastructure investment in national roads. It 
averages 0.48% of the GDP for the sample period.  It experiences a strongly increasing trend during the 
sample period, from 0.34% of the GDP in the early years of the sample to 0.76% by the end of the sample 
period.  The second type of public investment (pinv2) is core infrastructure investment in municipal roads. It 
averages 0.40% of the GDP for the sample period and shows less of a variation in that it averages 0.35% in 
the first part of the sample and 0.45% in the second. The third type of public investment (pinv3) is core 
infrastructure investment in highways.  It represents an average of 0.21% of the GDP over the sample period, 
although the average in the early years is just 0.13% and in the second part of the sample is 0.32%. The fourth 
type of public investment (pinv4) is core infrastructure investment in ports. It represents on average 0.12% of 
the GDP and has experienced a decline from 0.15% in the 1970s and 80s to about 0.08% in the last decade. 
The fifth type of public investment (pinv5) is infrastructure investment in airports, and has remained stable 
over the sample period at about 0.05% of the GDP.  Finally, the sixth type (pinv6) is core infrastructure 
investment in railways. It averages 0.29% of the GDP for the period and it only shows an upward trend in the 
last few years of the sample.  
Overall, aggregate public investment (pinv) averages 1.55% of the GDP for the sample period. It 
changes, however, from an average of 1.24% for 1976-88 to an average of 1.96% for 1989-1998. The data 
suggests that the increase through the 1990s in the overall figures is due mostly to increases in public 
investment in national roads (pinv1) and highways (pinv3) and, more recently, in railroad investment (pinv6). 
All of the considerations above suggest that the data fully reflect the conventional wisdom that the 
EU structural transfer programs brought a greater dynamism to the public investment in infrastructures.  They 
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are also very informative about the effects of the EU Community Support Frameworks in terms of the 
composition of public investment in transportation infrastructures.  In fact, core investment in national roads 
(pinv1) is one of the greatest beneficiaries of these programs. Its share on total public investment increased 
from 27.4% in the 1980s to 33.7% in the 1990s. Core investment in highways (pinv3) also increased its share, 
from 10.1% to 16.5%. Core investment in railways (pinv6), was also positively affected by EU programs. 
During the period between 1989 and 1998, it represents 19.3% of total public investment after having 
accounted for about 17% until 1988. On the other side of the spectrum are the other types of public investment 
whose shares decreased during the period covered by EU programs. The share of public investment on 
municipal roads (pinv2) declined from 29.2% to 23.3%, while the share of investment on airports (pinv5) 
declined from 3.7% to 2.9%. However, the greater losses occurred in public investment on ports (pinv4). 
From a share of 12.1% in the period before 1989, it represents only 2.9% of total public investment during the 
1990s. 
Besides the changes in magnitude and composition of public investment before and after the 
Community Support Frameworks, it is also possible to detect some changes from the first program (1989-93) 
and second (1994-98). The shares of public investment on national roads (pinv1) and on railways (pinv6) 
show an increasing trend during the two structural programs. Their shares to total public investment during the 
second program are higher than the average share for the 1990s. The share of public investment on highways 
(pinv3), decreased from 17.4% to 15.7% to total public investment during the second program. Public 
investment on municipal roads (pinv2) shows a continuous decreasing pattern during the 1990, from 29.2% 
before the structural programs, to 25.9% and 20.6% during the first and the second programs, respectively. 
Public investment on ports (pinv4), whose share to total was 12.1% in the period until 1988, suffered a sharp 
decline during the first program to 5.3%. During the second program, its share still decreased to 3.5%. Finally, 
the share of public investment on airports (pinv5) decreased to 3.4% during the first program, and to 2.4% 
thereafter. 
We conclude this discussion of the public investment data with some brief international comparisons. 
 International data comparisons are very difficult.  This is mostly due to the fact that the definition of the 
public investment data and its scope vary greatly across countries.  Furthermore, detailed disaggregated public 
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investment data sets are not readily available for most countries.  Despite these cautionary words we provide a 
tentative comparison of aggregate public investment in transportation infrastructures in Portugal, Spain and 
the United States.  For the Spanish data sources and specific definitions see Pereira and Roca  (1999) and for 
the US case see Pereira (2000). We present the evolution of public investment in transportation infrastructures 
as a percentage of the GDP for these three countries in Figure 9.  
There are two aspects that are worth mentioning.  First, aggregate public investment in transportation 
infrastructures in Portugal is of the same order of magnitude as in Spain. In both countries public investment 
in transportation infrastructures tends to be somewhat above the levels for the US, in particular after the late 
1980s. This is an obvious implication of the EU structural programs, which have been in effect for both 
countries since 1989. Second, the upward trend that can be detected after the late 1980s in both Portugal and 
Spain is much less pronounced in the Spanish case after 1993.  This can also be explained by the 
characteristics of the EU structural programs.  Indeed, the EU structural programs for Spain became less 
important after 1994, with the inception of the second Community Support Framework. 
 
B. Univariate and cointegration analysis 
We start by using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) t-test to test the null hypothesis of a unit root 
in the different variables.  We use the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to determine the optimal number 
of lagged differences to be included in the regressions, and we include deterministic components, a constant 
and/or a trend, in the regressions if they are statistically significant.  
The results of the ADF t-tests applied to the different variables in log-levels, are presented in the top 
part of Table 6.  In all the cases, the t-statistics are lower, in absolute levels, than the 5% critical values.  
Therefore, the ADF tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in these variables. In turn, the results 
of ADF t-tests applied to the first differences of the log-levels, i.e., the growth rates of the original variables, 
are presented in bottom part of Table 6. All critical values are greater, in absolute value, than the 5% critical 
value.  Therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis of unit roots in the growth rates of the variables. We take 
this evidence as an indication that stationarity in first differences is a good approximation for all the time 
series under consideration. 
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We also test the null hypothesis of a unit root in the different variables using the Phillips-Perron test, 
which takes into consideration the possible existence of structural breaks in the evolution of the variables. This 
is an important step since due to the different EU structural programs structural breaks are likely to exist. We 
follow the same strategy as above in the determination of optimal lags and deterministic components in the 
tests. The test results are reported in Table 7.  The results from the Phillips-Perron unit roots tests completely 
confirm the previous unit root test results.  Again the strong evidence is that stationarity in first differences is a 
good approximation for all the time series under consideration.  
It should be pointed out that this empirical evidence is consistent with the conventional wisdom in the 
macroeconomics literature that aggregate public investment, output, employment, and private investment are 
stationary in first differences. Although our public investment series is more disaggregated, the same pattern 
of stationarity in first differences is not surprising. 
We now test for cointegration among output, employment, aggregated private investment, and 
aggregated public investment as well as each one of the six public investment variables. We use the standard 
Engle-Granger approach to test for cointegration.  We have chosen this procedure over the often-used 
Johansen approach for two reasons.  First, since we do not have any priors that suggest the possible existence 
of more than one cointegration relationship, the Johansen approach is not strictly necessary.  More 
importantly, however, for small samples, Johansen's tests are known to induce strong bias in favor of finding 
cointegration when it does not exist.  [See, for example, Gonzalo and Lee (1998).] Therefore, our relatively 
small sample size suggests that the standard Engle-Granger approach will lead to more accurate results. 
Following the standard Engle-Granger approach, we perform four tests in each case.  This is because 
it is possible that one of the variables will enter the cointegrating relationship with a statistically insignificant 
coefficient.  We do not know, a priori, whether or not this will happen.  If it does happen, however, a test that 
uses such a variable as the endogenous variable will not pick up the cointegration.  Therefore, a different 
variable is endogenous in each of the four tests.   We apply the ADF t-test to the residuals from the regressions 
of each variable on the remaining variables. In all of the tests, the optimal lag structure is chosen using the 
BIC, and a deterministic component is included if it is statistically significant.  
The results of the cointegration tests at the aggregate level are reported on the top part of Table 8.  
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The value of the t-statistics is lower, in absolute value, than the 5% critical values for at least three of the four 
cases considered.  Moreover, all the test statistics are lower, in absolute value, than the 1% critical values.  
Thus, the ADF tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of a random walk, and we cannot reject that the variables 
are not co-integrated at this aggregated level.  
Cointegration tests were also performed with aggregate output, employment and private investment, 
together with each of the six different types of public investment.  Results are also reported in Table 8. For all 
six public investment variables, the value of the t-statistics is lower, in absolute value, than the 5% critical 
values for all but four of the twenty-four cases considered. We take this as strong evidence that, consistently 
with the results at the aggregate level, the variables are not cointegrated at the more disaggregated level. 
 
C. VAR specifications and estimates 
We have now determined that all of the variables have the same order of integration and, in 
particular, that they are stationary of first order.  We have also determined that the variables do not seem to be 
cointegrated, either at the aggregate level or at the more disaggregated level.  Accordingly, we follow the 
standard procedure in the literature and determine the specifications of the VAR models using growth rates of 
the original variables (denoted by ggdp, gemp, ginv, gpinv, etc).   
We estimate seven VAR models.  All VAR models include aggregate output, employment, and 
private investment.  In addition, each of the seven VAR models includes a different public investment variable 
- one for aggregate public investment and one for each of the six different types of public investment.  This 
means that, consistently with our conceptual arguments, the public investment variables are endogenous 
variables throughout the estimation procedure.  For the sake of brevity, the details on the model selection for 
the different VAR models are not reported here. They are available from the authors upon request.  
The specifications of the different VAR models are determined using the BIC.  The test results are 
reported in Table 9.  The VAR specification has two dimensions, which were determined jointly - the 
specification of the deterministic components and the consideration of the possibility of structural breaks. In 
all cases a first order specification were selected. A higher order was not considered due to relative small size 
of sample. The BIC selects a specification with constant and trend for the disaggregated models for national 
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roads, municipal roads, highways, and ports. For the aggregate model, as well as the disaggregated models for 
airports and for railways, the BIC selects a specification with only a constant.   
In order to consider the possible structural changes due to the two Community Support Frameworks, 
different VAR specifications were considered.  One could possibly distinguish three periods in which there 
might have been structural changes: the period before 1989, the period of first program, i.e., 1989-93 and the 
period of the second program, i.e., 1994-98.  Therefore, we consider three alternatives in terms of the VAR 
specification. The first is the case of no structural break/no dummies.  The second is the case of one structural 
break/one dummy distinguishing the periods before and after the EU structural programs.  Finally, we consider 
the possibility of two structural breaks/two dummies reflecting the possibility of the three different periods 
mentioned above. We find that the BIC criterion leads to the selection of VAR with two structural breaks/two 
dummies for aggregate public investment as well as for each one of the six types of public investment.  This 
suggests that in addition to considering the differences before and after the EU structural programs, there are 
also important changes associated with each of the EU structural programs.  
 
 
III. Identifying and Measuring the Effects of Innovations in Public Investment  
 
We use the impulse-response functions associated with the estimated VAR models to examine the 
effects of the different types of public investment on the performance of output, employment and private 
investment variables.  In this context our methodology allows dynamic feedbacks among the different 
variables to play a critical role.  This is true in both the identification of innovations in the public investment 
variables and the measurement of the effects of such innovations.   
 
A. Identifying innovations in the public investment variables 
While the public investment variables are endogenous in our econometric framework, the key 
methodological issue for the determination of the effects of public investment on the other variables is the 
identification of innovations in the public investment variables that are truly exogenous.  This means that we 
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need to identify shocks to public investment variables that are not contemporaneously correlated with shocks 
in the remaining variables.  These exogenous shocks are not subject to the reverse causation problem.  In 
dealing with this issue we draw from the approach typically followed in the literature on the effects of 
monetary policy on the economy [see, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996, 1998), and 
Rudebush (1998).] 
Ideally, the identification of shocks to public investment which are uncorrelated with shocks in other 
variables would result from knowing what fraction of the government appropriations in each period is due to 
purely non-economic reasons.  The econometric counterpart to this idea is to imagine a government policy 
function which relates the rate of growth of public investment to the information in the relevant government 
information set; in our case, the past and current observations of the growth rates of the output, employment 
and private investment variables.  The residuals from this policy function reflect the unexpected component to 
the evolution of public investment and are uncorrelated with other innovations. 
In the central case, we assume that the relevant information set for the government policy function 
includes past values but not current values of the other variables.  This is equivalent in the context of the 
standard Choleski decomposition to assuming that innovations in public investment lead innovations in the 
other variables.  This means that we allow innovations in public investment to affect the other variables 
contemporaneously, but not the reverse.   
We have two reasons for making this our central case. First, it seems reasonable to believe that the 
private sector reacts within a year to innovations in public investment decisions. Second, it also seems 
reasonable to assume that the public sector is unable to adjust public investment decisions to innovations in 
the private-sector variables within a year.  This is due to the time lags involved in information gathering and 
public decision-making. Nevertheless, to determine the robustness of our central case results, we also consider 
all the possible alternatives in terms of the definition of which observations of the private sector variables are 
included in the government information set.  This is equivalent to considering all the possible orderings of the 
variables within the Choleski decomposition framework. We report the corresponding range of results for the 
variance decomposition in Table 10 and for the impact indicators in Table 11.  
It should be pointed out that the sensitivity analysis efforts could conceivably be generalized in two 
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different directions.  First, we could consider the effects of innovations in the private sector variables, for 
example a supply shock, under our current sensitivity analysis framework.   To do so, however, would require 
a great deal of assumptions as to the ordering of the private sector variables.  Our approach has the advantage 
of providing a measure of the effects of innovations in public investment variables on private sector variables 
that is independent of the ordering of the private sector variables.  We can, therefore, remain agnostic about 
the issue of the order of these variables.   Second, we could generalize the sensitivity analysis framework to 
consider non-recursive or signal extraction schemes.  This would reflect, however, an econometric more than 
an economic concern.  It would only be justified if we had less strong priors about what the central case 
should be and it would entail alternatives of less clear economic interpretation. Because of these reasons we 
have not pursued either path in this paper.  
 
B. Policy functions 
The policy functions for aggregate public investment as well as the different types of public 
investment are reported in Table 12. These policy functions relate the evolution of the public investment 
variables to the evolution of the private sector variables lagged one year, according to the selected VAR 
specification.  For the aggregate model, there is no feedback from the other variables to public investment.  
This means that public investment is truly an exogenous variable.  
It is interesting to note that the exogeneity of public investment in Portugal is in contrast with the 
findings for the US, for example.  In fact, Pereira (2000) shows that changes in public investment in the US 
are positively correlated with lagged changes in output and negatively correlated with lagged changes in 
employment. Therefore, changes in private-sector variables affect the evolution of public investment in the 
US, which is not an exogenous variable.  The exogeneity of public investment decisions in Portugal, however, 
is easily explained by the fact that for long public investment decisions have been closely related with the 
Portuguese participation in the EU.  This is particularly true after 1989, when the bulk of the public 
investment in transportation infrastructures in Portugal has been conducted under the two Community Support 
Frameworks.  These programs are typically negotiated between the recipient economies and the EU, focusing 
on long-term goals and deliberately avoiding short-term considerations. 
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It should be pointed out that while public investment seems to be an exogenous variable at the 
aggregate level, the aggregate results hide some important effects on the evolution of different types of public 
investment. This means that although the magnitude of public investment seems to be truly exogenous there 
may be some effects from the economy on the composition of public investment.  
In fact, the policy functions suggest that changes in the evolution of public investment in national 
roads (pinv1) respond positively to changes in output while the evolution of public investment in municipal 
roads (pinv2) depends positively on the evolution of private investment. In turn, the evolution of investment in 
highways (pinv3) depends positively on the evolution of employment and negatively on the evolution of 
private investment. Public investment in ports (pinv4) depends positively on lagged changes in output and 
negatively on lagged changes in private investment.  Finally, the evolution of public investment in airports 
(pinv5) and in railroads (pinv6) does not seem to respond to lagged economic performance. 
 
C.  The impulse-response functions 
We consider the effects of one-percentage point, one-time random shocks in the rates of growth of 
the different types of public investment on output, employment, and private investment.  We expect these 
temporary shocks in the growth rates of the different types of public investment to have temporary effects on 
the growth rates of the other variables.  They will, however, have permanent effects on the levels of those 
variables.  The accumulated impulse response functions are reported in Figures 10-16. 
There are a few interesting points worth mentioning in terms of these accumulated impulse-response 
functions.  Let us start by acknowledging that all accumulated impulse-response functions converge within 
approximately a five-year period. This is not inconsistent with the idea that public investment takes time to 
build before it really impacts the private sector performance.  This is because our measures of public 
investment are aggregate measures, which are made of spending from a series of overlapping public 
investment projects.  This being the case, in any given year a substantial part of the observed public 
investment corresponds to projects that have been concluded that year.  
It should also be noted that the convergence path of the private sector variables is not only relatively 
fast but also very smooth.  In turn, the convergence path of the public investment variables, although fast, is 
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less smooth in the early years.  This pattern can easily be understood if one considers that the initial exogenous 
shock to public investment variables is followed by an endogenous adjustment in public investment in 
response to the private sector variables.  This endogenous adjustment is dictated in the context of the VAR 
model by the policy functions presented in Table 12 and discussed above.    
These policy functions suggest a negative recursive pattern in the evolution of public investment in 
addition to their response to private sector variables.  This negative recursive pattern dominates in the early 
years while the effects on the private sector variables are relatively small.  This explains the dip in the 
impulse-response function in the early years.  In later years, however, the positive feed back from the 
evolution of the private sector variables seems to dominate, although in some cases it is not strong enough to 
bring the accumulated long-term change in public investment to its initial level on impact.  Hence, for 
aggregate public investment (pinv), for example, the long-term change in public investment associated with a 
1.0 percentage point change on impact is 1.2 approximately, while for national roads (pinv1) is about 1.0, and 
for municipal roads (pinv2) is about 0.8. 
  
D. Measuring the effects of innovations in public investment variables 
In this paper we estimate the long-term accumulated elasticities of the different variables with respect 
to each type of public investment.  Long-term is defined as the time horizon over which the growth effects of 
innovations disappear, i.e., the accumulated impulse-response functions converge. These elasticities represent 
the total percentage point changes in the different variables for each long-term accumulated percentage point 
change in public investment once all the dynamic feedback effects among the different variables have been 
considered.  
We report the long-term accumulated marginal productivity of public investment in terms of the other 
variables in Tables 13 to 15.  These figures measure the change, in million euros, in output and private 
investment for every million euros accumulated change in public investment. In Table 14, we report the effects 
in terms of the number of jobs created in the long-term per one million euros in public investment.  
We obtain the marginal product of private investment reported in Table 15, by multiplying the output 
to public investment ratio for the last ten years by the elasticity of output with respect to public investment. 
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The choice of the output to public investment ratio for the last ten years is designed to reflect the relative 
scarcity of public investment of the different types.  We consider the relative scarcity at the margin of the 
sample period without letting these ratios be overly affected by business cycle factors or by the different 
priorities established by EU structural programs.  
It should be noted that we use the term marginal product in a way that departs from the conventional 
definition of the word. This is because these elasticities and marginal products are not based on ceteris paribus 
assumptions. In this paper, the term marginal product includes all of the dynamic feedbacks among the 
variables. Therefore, the marginal product that we calculate is a total marginal product.  That is, it measures 
both the direct effects of public investment on output, and the indirect effects of public investment on output 
through changes in the evolution of inputs.  Of course, this is the relevant concept from the standpoint of 
policy making.  
Finally, the annual rates of return, also reported on Table 15, are calculated from the marginal 
product figures by assuming a life horizon of twenty years for all types of public capital assets.  That is, the 
rate of return applied to one euro over a twenty-year period yields the value of the accumulated marginal 
product.  These rates of return are adjusted to accommodate for a public capital depreciation rate of 5%, 
which is implicit in the life horizon of twenty years for the public capital assets. 
 
 
IV.  On the Economic Effects of Public Investment 
 
A. Aggregate effects of public investment in transportation infrastructure  
The effects on employment and private investment of public investment at the aggregate level are 
reported on the top part of Tables 13 and 14.  The results from the impulse response analysis at the aggregate 
level suggest that in Portugal, public investment in transportation infrastructure crowds in both private 
investment and employment.  Indeed, when we estimate the effects of shocks to aggregate public investment in 
transportation infrastructures on the evolution of the other variables, we find that the elasticity of private 
investment with respect to aggregate public investment is 0.639, which corresponds to a marginal product of 
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8.1.  This means that at the aggregate level, public investment crowds in private investment and that one euro 
of additional public investment will induce, in the long-term, an accumulated total of 8.1 euros of private 
investment.  In turn, the elasticity of employment with respect to aggregate public investment is 0.079. This 
figure suggests that 230 additional jobs will be created in the long-term for each additional one million euros 
in public investment in transportation infrastructures. 
In turn, the long-term effects of innovations in investment in transportation infrastructures on output 
are reported on the top part of Table 15.  We find that aggregate public investment has a positive effect on 
output with an elasticity of 0.183, which corresponds to a marginal product of 9.5.  This implies that the 
increase of one euro in public investment leads to a total accumulated increase of 9.5 euros in output.  
One possible way of interpreting the marginal product figures is by calculating the corresponding 
average rate of return.   The estimated annual rate of return over a twenty-year period of public investment in 
transportation infrastructures is 15.9%.  This figure suggests that the rate of return of public investment in 
transportation infrastructures is well above the range one would expect for the rate of return on private 
investment.  From this perspective, the reliance on public investment in transportation infrastructures as the 
cornerstone of a development strategy in Portugal seems to have been justified. 
Another possible way of interpreting this figure is by calculating the value of the tax revenues 
generated by this increase in output.  Since tax revenues tend to hover around the 35% of the GDP, then the 
marginal product of public investment in transportation infrastructures suggests that over the life expectancy 
of the public capital assets, the public sector would collect 3.3 euros.  Therefore, the public sector collects an 
additional 3.3 euros in tax revenues for each euro spent in public infrastructure.  According to this evidence, 
the public investment assets in transportation infrastructures pay for themselves over their life span and still 
generate additional funds, which can be used for other public activities.  
 
B. Effects of public investment in different types of transportation infrastructure  
In the discussion above, we have established empirically that public investment in transportation 
infrastructure makes a positive and significant contribution to private-sector performance.  We are ready to 
determine which types of public investment are the most productive.  The positive crowding in effects of 
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public investment in transportation infrastructures on private investment and employment observed at the 
aggregate level are also present at the disaggregated level.  All types of public infrastructure in transportation 
affect private investment and employment positively in the long-term.  Not surprisingly, the same pattern can 
be found in terms of the effects on output. 
The effects of public investment in transportation infrastructures on private investment are reported 
in Table 13.  In terms of the effects of public investment on private investment, the strongest effect comes 
from public investment in national roads (pinv1) with an elasticity of 0.766. It is followed, by the investments 
in municipal roads (pinv2), ports (pinv4), and railways (pinv6) with elasticities of 0.254, 0.281 and 0.264, 
respectively.  Finally, public investment in highways (pinv3) and in airports (pinv5) display the lowest 
elasticities, 0.110 and 0.079, respectively. 
In terms of marginal productivities, a better measure of relative scarcity, the highest marginal effects 
on private investment come from public investment in ports (pinv4) and airports (pinv5) with marginal 
products of 84.4 and 39.1 respectively.  The marginal products of public investment in national roads (pinv1), 
municipal roads (pinv2), and railroads (pinv6) are still relatively large – 29.6, 14.1, and 18.8, respectively. 
The lowest effects on private investment come from public investment in highways (pinv3) with a marginal 
product of 9.2. 
The effects of public investment in transportation infrastructures on employment are reported in 
Table 14. The strongest effect comes now from shocks to ports (pinv4) with an elasticity of 0.070, followed by 
municipal roads (pinv2), with an elasticity of 0.054, national roads (pinv1), with an elasticity of 0.045.  In 
turn, the elasticities of public investment in highways (pinv3) and railways (pinv6) are substantially smaller, 
0.009 and 0.012, respectively.  Finally, the effect on employment of public investment in airports (pinv5) is 
only marginally different from zero.   
In terms of job creation, one million euros invested in ports (pinv4) will create, in the long-term, 
about 4800 new jobs. This number reduces sharply to 692, 404, 204, and 164 new jobs per million euros 
invested in municipal roads (pinv2), national roads (pinv1), railways (pinv6), and highways (pinv3) 
respectively.  Finally, public investment in airports (pinv5) actually eliminates about 500 jobs per million 
euros. 
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The effects of public investment in transportation infrastructures on output are reported in Table 15.  
The effects of shocks to the different public investment variables on output are all positive. In terms of the 
long-term accumulated elasticities, the strongest effect comes from shocks to public investment in national 
roads (pinv1) with an elasticity of 0.198.  This is followed by the effect of shocks in public investment in 
municipal roads (pinv2), with an elasticity of 0.098, in ports (pinv4), with an elasticity of 0.087, and railways 
(pinv6), with an elasticity of 0.062.  In turn, the elasticities of output with respect to public investment in 
highways (pinv3) and airports (pinv5) are the smallest, respectively 0.024 and 0.009. 
Let us now consider the marginal product figures.  These figures are a better measure of the relative 
effects of different types of public investment.  This is because they reflect the relative scarcity of the different 
types of public investment at the margin of the sample period.  The marginal product figures suggest that all 
types of public investment are productive.  Although there is a wide range of effects, four of the six types of 
transportation infrastructure have marginal products within a relatively small range, between 18.5 and 31.4. 
This is the case of public investment in national roads (pinv1), municipal roads (pinv2), airports (pinv5) and 
railroads (pinv6), with marginal products of 31.4, 21.3, 19.2, and 18.5, respectively.  The two extremes are 
given by public investment in highways (pinv3) with a marginal product of just 8.2 and public investment in 
ports (pinv4) with a marginal product of 107.1.   
Another way of interpreting these results is by considering the rates of return on the different types of 
public investment.  Again, all rates of return for all different types of public investment in infrastructures are 
above the expected ranges for private investment.  Over a twenty-year period, the average rate of return to 
public investment in ports (pinv4), is 30.8%, and is the highest. It is closely followed by the rate of return to 
public investment in national roads (pinv1) of 23.0%, municipal roads (pinv2) of 20.9%, airports (pinv5) of 
20.0%, and railroads (pinv6) of 19.7%.  The lowest rate of return, although still high, is for public investment 
in highways (pinv3) with 15.0%.  
It is important to highlight the importance of considering both the direct and the indirect effects of 
innovations in public investment.  The explicit consideration of the indirect effects of public investment on 
private investment and employment allows us to highlight the mechanisms through which the different types of 
public investment tend to affect output.  Indeed, the strong effects of public investment in ports (pinv4) on 
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output, seems to be related to strong effects on both employment and private investment.  The converse is true 
for public investment in highways (pinv3) in which case the less strong effects seem to be related to less strong 
effects on also both private investment and employment.  In turn, the effects on output of public investment in 
municipal roads seems to be due mostly to the important effects on employment while the effects of public 
investment in airports (pinv5) seem to be mostly related to the effects on private investment. 
 
C. Comparison with the international evidence 
The comparison of the results in this paper with the international evidence available in the literature 
is not easy.  This is primarily because the international literature has used a variety of econometric techniques, 
which makes similar terms, like elasticity or marginal product not always comparable with the way such terms 
are used in this paper.  Also, most of the literature on the effects of public infrastructures considers public 
investment as an exogenous variable and focuses on the effects of public investment on private output and is 
not designed to address the impact on private inputs. Furthermore, the definitions of public investment used in 
the literature vary wildly.   
Although comparisons are difficult they are not impossible.  The results in this paper are most 
directly comparable with the results in Pereira and Roca (1999) for Spain and in Pereira (2000) for the US. 
Pereira and Roca (1999) consider for Spain the effects of public capital in transportation infrastructures.  The 
empirical results suggest a marginal product of private investment with respect to public investment of 10.2 
and that one million euros in public investment create 129 jobs in the long-term. Moreover, the results indicate 
that the marginal product of public investment in Spain is 5.5.  This corresponds to a rate of return of 8.9%.  
Accordingly, the results obtained in this paper for Portugal, 230 new jobs created per million euros in public 
investment and a rate of return of 15.9%, tend to be higher than the ones for Spain.  
In turn, Pereira (2000) finds that public investment, although under a much broader definition, 
crowds in private investment with a marginal product of 0.8 while it seems to have a negligible effect on 
private employment.  The results in this paper for Portugal show much larger figures for the marginal effects 
of public investment in transportation infrastructures on private investment – about ten times, while the effects 
on employment in Portugal are substantial - 230 jobs per one million euros in public investment.  More 
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importantly, Pereira (2000) suggests that the marginal product of public investment in the US is 4.5.  This 
corresponds to a rate of return of 7.8%, compared to a rate of return of 15.9% in the Portuguese case.  Again, 
the results in this paper tend to be substantially higher than the results for the US.  This is understandable 
given the relatively greater scarcity of public infrastructures in the Portuguese economy. 
International comparisons in terms of the disaggregated effects of different types of public investment 
are even more difficult.  Again, probably the closest comparisons can be made with Pereira (2000). In Pereira 
(2000) there is a core infrastructure variable, which represents highways and streets and that closely resembles 
the aggregate of national roads, municipal roads, and highways.  Another variable in Pereira (2000), core 
infrastructure in ports, airports, etc, seems to be close to the aggregate of ports and airports in this paper. The 
results indicate that the marginal products of these two types of public investment are 1.97 and 19.79, 
respectively. The correspondent rates of return are 3.4% and 16.1%, respectively. In this paper, the range of 
rates of return is from 15.0% to 23.0% for public investment in roads and highways, and 30.8% and 20.0% for 
public investment in ports and airports, respectively.  Again, the figures for Portugal tend to be substantially 
higher than the ones for the US. 
An important feature of the empirical results in this paper is that in Portugal public investment in 
transportation infrastructures would more than pay for itself in the form of added tax revenues over the life 
span of the public investment assets.  This is reminiscent of the supply-side Laffer-curve effect found for the 
United States by the early literature. Indeed, the seminal contribution of Aschauer (1989a) has been 
interpreted as suggesting that [see, for example, Reich (1991)].  This result was disputed by subsequent 
research for the United States case.  For example, Pereira (2000) suggests that the marginal product of public 
investment would just pay for itself over time. Furthermore, Pereira and Roca (1999) show that the same is 
true for Spain while the results in Mittnik and Newman (1998) for Canada, France, Germany, Japan, The 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, in a time series context not incompatible with the approach in this 
paper, seem to imply the same.  Interestingly enough, however, the same type of result seems to resurface in 
the case of Portugal.  This leaves open the question as to whether a supply-side Laffer-curve effect while not 
present in more developed economies could be a fixture of less developed countries. 
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V.  Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper analyzes empirically the effects of public investment in transportation infrastructure on 
economic performance in Portugal. To do so, we use a new data set on public investment in transportation 
infrastructures in Portugal for the period 1976-98, recently published by Pereira and Andraz (2001).  We 
follow a VAR approach, which is consistent with the argument that the analysis of the effects of public 
investment on output, employment and private investment variables requires the consideration of dynamic 
feedback effects among the different variables.  
We can summarize the empirical results as follows.  We find that in the long-term, aggregate public 
investment in transportation infrastructures crowds in private investment as well as employment.  More 
importantly, we find that it has a positive effect on output.  Indeed, we estimate that one euro invested in 
public investment increases output in the long-term by 9.5 euros. This figure suggests that public investment 
pays for itself 3.3 times in the form of tax revenues over the life span of the public capital asset.  Furthermore, 
the marginal product figure corresponds to a rate of return of 15.9%. This rate of return is clearly higher than 
the rate of return expected on private investment activities.  
The importance of the effects of public investment in transportation infrastructures at the aggregate 
level opens the door to the next stage of our analysis: the study of the effects of different types of public 
investment on economic performance.  Consistent with the aggregate results, we find that all types of public 
investment crowd in the other variables. Nevertheless, a close look at the effects of different types of public 
investment on the remaining variables suggests that the disaggregation of public investment is very 
informative, since it shows which types of public investments are the most productive. In terms of marginal 
productivities, the highest effects on private investment come from public investment in ports, airports and 
national roads. In terms of job creation, the highest effects come from public investment in ports, municipal 
roads, and national roads.  Finally, in terms of the effects of output the largest effects come from investment in 
ports followed closely by national roads, municipal roads, airports, and railroads. 
The results in this paper are very important and timely from a public policy perspective in Portugal.  
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From a retroactive perspective, the empirical evidence suggests strongly that public investment in 
transportation infrastructures has been a powerful instrument to promote long-term growth in Portugal.  
Moreover, it suggests that the strategy followed by the Portuguese authorities of investing in public 
infrastructures has been justified both from a long-term development perspective as well as from a public 
budgetary perspective.   
More importantly, from a prospective perspective, the results in this paper provide broad guidelines 
for the country's future development strategies.  This is very important due to the still relative backwardness 
now. As a matter of fact, Portuguese GDP is still at about 75% of EU average while sources of outside 
financing are being reduced and the country faces a great budgetary restraint in the context of EMU. This 
requires greater attention to relative benefits and much more fine-tuned development policies.  It is also 
important to highlight the fact that given current budgetary constraints in the context of the Stability and 
Growth Programs, the tendency for achieving budgetary consolidation through reduction in public investment 
is a mistake from the standpoint of long-term growth.  It is also a mistake from the standpoint of long-term 
budgetary situation. 
Although the results in this paper are important from the perspective of policy making in Portugal, its 
interest is far from parochial.  In fact, there is a number of Eastern European waiting to join the EU.  These 
countries have levels of development and infrastructure scarcities that are not unlike the Portuguese case by 
the end of 1980s.  Furthermore, there are already structural transfer programs in place to smooth the transition 
of these countries into the EU and they are expected to benefit from large EU structural funds upon accession, 
much like Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain currently do.  From this paper we learn that the general 
strategy of investing in public infrastructure may be very effective in promoting real convergence of these 
economies to EU standards.   Furthermore, given the difficulties of data gathering one would encourage data 
collection and coordination of policies and implementation agencies from early stages is critical to provide 
info to help design basic programs. 
Despite all the considerations above it is appropriate to conclude on a cautionary note.  Although we 
have established empirically the importance of public investment in transportation infrastructure for economic 
development in Portugal, we have done so with a relatively small data set.  This places some limitations on the 
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statistical analysis in the paper.  More importantly, maybe, is the fact that establishing that public investment 
has been important in the past does not establish that it will be important in the future.  Indeed, one could 
easily conjecture a pattern of decreasing marginal returns to public investment.  Finally, even if we could 
legitimately conjecture, based on the relatively high rates of return we estimated, that these public investments 
will continue to be important, we did not address the issue of which types of investment are the most 
important.  Indeed, just showing that public investment in infrastructures is productive does not mean that it is 
more productive than private investment or investment in human capital, for example. 
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Table 1 - Data set for Portugal  
 
Years Output Employment Private investment Public investment 
1976 9.023.294 3.624 2.033.225 113.212 
1977 9.519.412 3.671 2.265.797 103.305 
1978 9.788.215 3.770 2.427.918 123.781 
1979 10.341.059 3.862 2.376.059 134.398 
1980 10.813.624 3.943 2.577.030 122.724 
1981 10.991.600 3.939 2.728.533 159.585 
1982 11.224.467 3.965 2.770.359 162.976 
1983 11.205.164 3.878 2.579.592 137.623 
1984 10.991.821 3.937 2.137.447 114.935 
1985 11.305.010 3.932 2.071.879 127.688 
1986 11.768.296 3.900 2.293.706 144.316 
1987 12.518.244 4.006 2.677.251 155.751 
1988 13.451.070 4.096 3.102.701 178.492 
1989 14.144.498 4.236 3.236.613 198.425 
1990 14.759.562 4.279 3.501.980 247.907 
1991 15.104.553 4.335 3.624.977 295.401 
1992 15.483.749 4.359 3.801.235 269.922 
1993 15.311.404 4.295 3.585.621 306.278 
1994 15.651.492 4.449 3.701.556 324.773 
1995 16.102.000 4.416 3.880.582 311.933 
1996 16.584.869 4.445 4.067.238 335.804 
1997 17.260.447 4.530 4.545.614 433.520 
1998 17.866.194 4.740 4.952.094 404.936 
 
Units: Output, private investment, and public investment – millions of 1995 escudos. 
  Labor – thousand workers. 
Sources: 
Output, employment and private investment: the Bank of Portugal/Banco de Portugal (1997), 
Commission of the European Communities (1999), and Ministry of Finance/Ministério das Finanças 
(2000) 
Public investment: Pereira and Andraz (2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28
Table 2 - Public investment in transportation infrastructures 
 
Years Aggregate 
public 
investment 
National 
roads 
Municipal 
roads 
Highways Ports Airports Railways 
1976 113.212 28.538 20.900 16.216 7.110 3.365 37.083 
1977 103.305 20.773 24.829 12.310 8.476 2.595 34.322 
1978 123.781 26.976 33.694 16.570 13.350 1.535 31.657 
1979 134.398 30.532 49.580 9.823 14.878 2.411 27.174 
1980 122.724 38.032 29.789 16.553 24.567 1.359 12.424 
1981 159.585 41.197 49.274 25.381 25.381 3.442 14.911 
1982 162.976 40.038 50.851 19.051 24.853 6.567 21.616 
1983 137.623 43.451 41.734 9.760 21.032 5.078 16.568 
1984 114.935 32.908 43.160 1.283 17.412 6.839 13.333 
1985 127.688 35.674 43.418 11.159 15.543 4.469 17.425 
1986 144.316 45.205 39.258 10.393 16.489 10.473 22.497 
1987 155.751 52.960 43.753 13.288 12.834 8.702 24.215 
1988 178.492 55.360 51.542 18.243 12.324 11.686 29.336 
1989 198.425 56.892 57.549 35.603 10.185 11.041 27.156 
1990 247.907 78.109 56.034 56.980 13.917 10.923 31.945 
1991 295.401 84.248 67.958 67.331 18.409 8.936 48.518 
1992 269.922 100.680 74.192 24.851 13.544 5.718 50.937 
1993 306.278 100.777 83.302 43.571 13.326 5.207 60.095 
1994 324.773 119.079 66.098 59.462 12.297 5.336 62.500 
1995 311.933 128.160 54.440 57.847 12.730 6.146 52.610 
1996 335.804 139.065 71.566 37.089 9.983 8.126 69.975 
1997 433.520 126.036 90.559 75.553 12.059 10.502 118.811 
1998 404.936 118.974 93.988 52.518 16.675 14.217 108.563 
 
Units: Millions of 1995 escudos. 
Source:  Pereira and Andraz (2001). 
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Table 3 – Public investment as a share of GDP (%) 
 
     Averages 
Public investment 1976-80 1981-85 1986-88 1989-93 1994-98 1976-88 1989-98 Sample Average 
pinv: Aggregate public investment 1.21 1.26 1.27 1.76 2.16 1.24 1.96 1.55 
pinv1: National roads 0.29 0.35 0.41 0.56 0.76 0.34 0.66 0.48 
pinv2: Municipal roads 0.32 0.41 0.36 0.45 0.45 0.36 0.45 0.40 
pinv3: Highways 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.31 0.34 0.13 0.32 0.21 
pinv4: Ports 0.14 0.19 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.15 0.08 0.12 
pinv5: Airports 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
pinv6: Railways 0.30 0.15 0.20 0.29 0.49 0.22 0.39 0.29 
 
 
Table 4 – Public investment as a share of Private Investment (%) 
 
     Averages 
Public investment 1976-80 1981-85 1986-88 1989-93 1994-98 1976-88 1989-98 Sample Average 
pinv: Aggregate public investment 5.13 5.72 5.95 7.40 8.56 5.55 7.98 6.60 
pinv1: National roads 1.24 1.58 1.91 2.35 3.02 1.53 2.69 2.03 
pinv2: Municipal roads 1.35 1.87 1.67 1.91 1.77 1.63 1.84 1.72 
pinv3: Highways 0.62 0.52 0.51 1.29 1.35 0.55 1.32 0.89 
pinv4: Ports 0.57 0.84 0.53 0.39 0.30 0.67 0.35 0.53 
pinv5: Airports 0.10 0.22 0.39 0.24 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.22 
pinv6: Railways 1.25 0.69 0.94 1.22 1.91 0.96 1.57 1.23 
 
 
Table 5 - Shares of total public investment (%) 
 
     Averages 
Public investment 1976-80 1981-85 1986-88 1989-93 1994-98 1976-88 1989-98 Sample 
Average 
pinv1: National roads 24.2 27.7 32.1 31.8 35.5 27.4 33.7 30.1 
pinv2: Municipal roads 26.2 32.8 28.1 25.9 20.6 29.2 23.3 26.6 
pinv3: Highways 12.1 8.9 8.7 17.4 15.7 10.1 16.5 12.9 
pinv4: Ports 11.3 14.8 8.9 5.3 3.5 12.1 4.4 8.7 
pinv5: Airports 1.9 3.9 6.5 3.4 2.4 3.7 2.9 3.4 
pinv6: Railways 24.4 12.0 15.9 16.3 22.2 17.6 19.3 18.3 
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Figure 1: Aggregate public investment in transportation infrastructures (pinv)
as % of GDP and private investment
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Figure 2: Public investment in national roads (pinv1)
as % of GDP and private investment
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Figure 3: Public investment in municipal roads (pinv2)
as % of GDP and private investment
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Figure 4: Public investment in highways (pinv3)
as % of GDP and private investment
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Figure 5: Public investment in ports (pinv4)
as % of GDP and private investment
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Figure 6: Public investment in airports (pinv5)
as % of GDP and private investment
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Figure 7: Public investment in railways (pinv6)
as % of GDP and private investment
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Figure 8: Composition of public investment in transportation infrastructures
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Figure 9: Aggregate public investment in transportation infrastructures
as % of GDP in Portugal, Spain and in the U.S.A.
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Table 6 – Testing for the null hypothesis of unit roots using the ADF test 
 
 Deterministic 
components 
Order 
(BIC) 
Test statistic Critical values 
5%                  1% 
Variables: log levels      
gdp: Output CT 2 -3.0118 -3.60 -4.38 
emp: Employment CT 0 -1.6349 -3.60 -4.38 
inv: Private investment CT 1 -2.0732 -3.60 -4.38 
pinv: Aggregate public investment CT 0 -1.8699 -3.60 -4.38 
pinv1: National roads CT 0 -1.9461 -3.60 -4.38 
pinv2 : Municipal roads CT 1 -3.2594 -3.60 -4.38 
pinv3: Highways CT 0 -3.4357 -3.60 -4.38 
pinv4: Ports C 0 -2.1310 -3.00 -3.75 
pinv5: Airports CT 2 -2.7925 -3.60 -4.38 
pinv6. Railways CT 2 -0.9072 -3.60 -4.38 
Variables: growth rates    
  
gdp: Output C 3 -4.6470 -3.00 -3.75 
emp: Employment C 0 -3.9231 -3.00 -3.75 
inv: Private investment N 0 -2.2950 -1.95 -2.66 
pinv: Aggregate public investment C 0 -4.8404 -3.00 -3.75 
pinv1: National roads C 0 -5.5086 -3.00 -3.75 
pinv2 : Municipal roads C 1 -4.1368 -3.00 -3.75 
pinv3: Highways N 0 -4.9659 -1.95 -2.66 
pinv4: Ports N 0 -3.3923 -1.95 -2.66 
pinv5: Airports N 0 -4.7955 -1.95 -2.66 
pinv6. Railways CT 1 -5.8943 -3.60 -4.38 
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Table 7 – Testing for the null hypothesis of unit roots using the Phillips-Perron test 
 
 Deterministic 
components 
Order 
(BIC) 
Test statistic Critical values 
5%                1% 
Variables: log levels      
gdp: Output C 1 -0.1828 -12.5 -17.2 
emp: Employment CT 0 -8.3216 -17.9 -22.5 
inv: Private investment CT 1 -22.4939 -17.9 -22.5 
pinv: Aggregate public investment CT 0 -8.0042 -17.9 -22.5 
pinv1: National roads CT 0 -11.7611 -17.9 -22.5 
pinv2 : Municipal roads CT 1 -17.4691 -17.9 -22.5 
pinv3: Highways CT 0 -13.6992 -17.9 -22.5 
pinv4: Ports C 0 -8.3041 -12.5 -17.2 
pinv5: Airports CT 2 -9.1929 -17.9 -22.5 
pinv6. Railways CT 2 -6.0600 -17.9 -22.5 
Variables: growth rates    
  
gdp: Output C 0 -10.1261 -12.5 -17.2 
emp: Employment C 0 -21.0370 -12.5 -17.2 
inv: Private investment N 0 -8.4164 -7.3 -11.9 
pinv: Aggregate public investment C 0 -23.0084 -12.5 -17.2 
pinv1: National roads C 0 -23.3204 -12.5 -17.2 
pinv2 : Municipal roads C 1 -36.6651 -12.5 -17.2 
pinv3: Highways N 0 -23.1967 -7.3 -11.9 
pinv4: Ports N 0 -16.1431 -7.3 -11.9 
pinv5: Airports N 0 -22.5798 -7.3 -11.9 
pinv6. Railways CT 1 -113.4204 -17.9 -22.5 
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Table 8 – Testing the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
 
Variables Deterministic 
Components 
Optimal Lag 
(BIC) 
Test Statistic       Critical Values     
       5%               1% 
gdp: Output CT 0 -1.4347 -4.16 -4.65 
emp: Employment C 0 -3.9402 -4.11 -4.73 
inv: Private investment CT 0 -3.1888 -4.16 -4.65 
pinv: Aggregate public investment CT 0 -4.5880 -4.16 -4.65 
      
gdp: Output CT 0 -1.3356 -4.16 -4.65 
emp: Employment C 0 -3.9385 -4.11 -4.73 
inv: Private investment CT 1 -2.8594 -4.16 -4.65 
pinv1: National roads N 2 -3.5147 -3.74 -4.30 
      
gdp: Output CT 0 -1.4802 -4.16 -4.65 
emp: Employment C 0 -4.3649 -4.11 -4.73 
inv: Private investment CT 0 -2.0492 -4.16 -4.65 
pinv2 : Municipal roads C 1 -4.8360 -4.11 -4.73 
      
gdp: Output CT 0 -2.1859 -4.16 -4.65 
emp: Employment C 0 -4.0019 -4.11 -4.73 
inv: Private investment CT 0 -1.9255 -4.16 -4.65 
pinv3: Highways CT 1 -5.3735 -4.16 -4.65 
      
gdp: Output CT 0 -1.7135 -4.16 -4.65 
emp: Employment C 2 -5.2319 -4.11 -4.73 
inv: Private investment CT 0 -1.6549 -4.16 -4.65 
pinv4: Ports C 0 -3.3592 -4.11 -4.73 
      
gdp: Output CT 0 -1.3165 -4.16 -4.65 
emp: Employment C 0 -4.0143 -4.11 -4.73 
inv: Private investment CT 0 -1.8647 -4.16 -4.65 
pinv5: Airports N 2 -2.9691 -3.74 -4.70 
      
gdp: Output CT 0 -2.0721 -4.16 -4.65 
emp: Employment C 0 -4.0632 -4.11 -4.73 
inv: Private investment CT 0 -3.6027 -4.16 -4.65 
pinv6. Railways CT 0 -3.7113 -4.16 -4.65 
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Table 9 – VAR specification (BIC) 
 
Public investment Model     
     order 
Deterministic 
components 
No dummy One dummy 
(1989)  
Two dummies 
(1989,1994) 
pinv: Aggregate public investment 1 N -24.79172 -24.89442 -25.11975 
 1 C -25.05496 -25.46241 -25.69166 
 1 CT -25.09007 -25.58873 -25.69035 
      
pinv1: National roads 1 N -24.85156 -24.94396 -25.52282 
 1 C -25.07617 -25.52986 -26.10160 
 1 CT -25.24993 -26.45380 -26.77999 
      
pinv2 : Municipal roads 1 N -23.64226 -23.68089 -23.73939 
 1 C -23.92128 -24.30213 -24.36215 
 1 CT -24.11397 -24.51930 -24.59061 
      
pinv3: Highways 1 N -20.04118 -20.08434 -20.13513 
 1 C -20.32396 -20.75705 -20.81506 
 1 CT -20.37029 -20.87376 -21.01449 
      
pinv4: Ports 1 N -23.77836 -23.84164 -23.89150 
 1 C -24.06601 -24.45286 -24.51007 
 1 CT -24.31672 -24.93027 -25.28925 
      
pinv5: Airports 1 N -21.64709 -21.68944 -21.81481 
 1 C -21.96905 -22.52255 -22.66662 
 1 CT -22.11673 -22.50320 -22.62232 
      
pinv6. Railways 1 N -22.95706 -23.30818 -23.35772 
 1 C -23.47973 -23.91985 -23.97603 
 1 CT -23.57522 -23.87059 -23.92901 
 
NB: In bold face is the selected specification. 
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Table 10 – Variance decomposition: percentage of long-term variation in the variables due to variations in public investment 
 
Variable Output Employment Investment Public Investment 
 
pinv: Aggregate public investment 
 
central case 37.6% 18.7% 37.2% 88.7% 
range of variation [9.8%;37.6%] [8.8%;19.2%] [6.9%;37.2%] [69.2%;88.7%] 
 
pinv1: National roads 
 
central case 33.5% 3.3% 43.9% 76.7% 
range of variation [0.2%;35.6%] [0.6%;24.8%] [0.1%;45.3%] [24.9%;76.7%] 
 
pinv2: Municipal roads 
 
central case 11.2% 11.0% 5.8% 64.1% 
range of variation [3.8%;11.2%] [7.9%;11.0%] [1.8%;5.8%] [57.9%;64.1%] 
 
pinv3: Highways 
 
central case 7.8% 3.9% 17.0% 53.7% 
range of variation [0.9%;7.8%] [2.5%;3.9%] [2.2%;17.0%] [38.4%;55.0%] 
 
pinv4: Ports 
 
central case 16.7% 32.1% 12.8% 65.7% 
range of variation [0.8%;16.7%] [1.9%;32.1%] [0.5%;12.8%] [28.7%;65.7%] 
 
pinv5: Airports 
 
central case 0.6% 7.1% 6.1% 90.5% 
range of variation [0.6%;5.5%] [0.4%;9.4%] [0.9%;11.6%] [80.7%;90.5%] 
 
pinv6: Railways 
 
central case 12.4% 10.8% 22.3% 90.5% 
range of variation [0.9%;23.4%] [0.7%;16.1%] [2.9%;30.5%] [64.4%;90.5%] 
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Table 11 – Long-term accumulated elasticities of private sector variables with respect to public investment 
 
Variable Output Employment Investment 
 
pinv: Aggregate public investment 
 
central case 0.18264 0.07860 0.63871 
range of variation [0.105;0.183] [0.045;0.079] [0.356;0.639] 
 
pinv1: National roads 
 
central case 0.19807 0.04524 0.76549 
range of variation [-0.133;0.202] [-0.206;0.049] [-0.259;0.772] 
 
pinv2: Municipal roads 
 
central case 0.09839 0.05441 0.25396 
range of variation [0.054;0.098] [0.032;0.054] [0.111;0.254] 
 
pinv3: Highways 
 
central case 0.02416 0.00865 0.11013 
range of variation [0.000;0.024] [0.000;0.009] [0.010;0.110] 
 
pinv4: Ports 
 
central case 0.08736 0.07025 0.28102 
range of variation [-0.057;0.087] [0.005;0.070] [-0.075;0.281] 
 
pinv5: Airports 
 
central case 0.00937 -0.00438 0.07858 
range of variation [-0.014;0.030] [-0.005;0.009] [0.002;0.137] 
 
pinv6: Railways 
 
central case 0.06247 0.01221 0.26418 
range of variation [0.014;0.090] [-0.010;0.031] [0.080;0.341] 
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Figure 10: Accumulated impulse response function for aggregate public investment (pinv)
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Figure 11: Accumulated impulse response functions for national roads (pinv1)
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Figure 12: Accumulated impulse response functions for municipal roads (pinv2)
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Figure 13: Accumulated impulse response functions for Highways (pinv3)
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Figure 14: Accumulated impulse response functions for ports (pinv4)
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Figure 15: Accumulated impulse response functions for airports (pinv5)
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Figure 16: Accumulated impulse response functions for railways (pinv6)
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Table 13 – Effects of public investment on private investment 
 
 
Public investment variable 
 
 
Elasticities 
 
 
Marginal productivity 
 
 
pinv:  Aggregate public investment 
 
central case  0.63871   8.12 
 
pinv1: National roads 
 
central case  0.76549   29.58 
 
pinv2: Municipal roads 
 
central case  0.25396   14.05 
 
pinv3: Highways 
 
central case  0.11013   9.19 
 
pinv4: Ports 
 
central case  0.28102   84.40 
 
pinv5: Airports 
 
central case  0.07858   39.13 
 
pinv6: Railways 
 
central case  0.26418   18.83 
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Table 14 – Effects of public investment on employment 
 
 
Public investment variable 
 
 
Elasticities 
 
 
           Number of jobs        
(per million of Euros) 
 
 
pinv: Aggregate public investment     
 
central case  0.07860   230 
 
pinv1: National roads 
 
central case  0.04524   404 
 
pinv2: Municipal roads 
 
central case  0.05441   692 
 
pinv3: Highways 
 
central case  0.00865   164 
 
pinv4: Ports 
 
central case  0.07025   4800 
 
pinv5: Airports 
 
central case  -0.00438   -500 
 
pinv6: Railways 
 
central case  0.01221   204 
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Table 15 - Effects of public investment on output 
 
 
Public investment variable 
 
 
Elasticities 
 
Marginal productivity 
 
Rates of return 
 
pinv: Aggregate public investment 
 
central case 0.18264 9.54 15.9% 
 
pinv1: National roads 
 
central case 0.19807 31.41 23.0% 
 
pinv2: Municipal roads 
 
central case 0.09839 22.32 20.9% 
 
pinv3: Highways 
 
central case 0.02416 8.24 15.0% 
 
pinv4: Ports 
 
central case 0.08736 107.14 30.8% 
 
pinv5: Airports 
 
central case 0.00937 19.18 20.0%  
 
pinv6: Railways 
 
central case 0.06247 18.47 19.7% 
 
    
 
 
 
